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 Started 1998, Indonesia faced political instability due to the social 
unrest and the step down of Indonesian President Soeharto. The condition 
impacted into the East Timor condition to have self-determination right to 
have its independent. Indeed, historically The Dutch colonialized Indonesia; 
meanwhile East Timor was colonialized by the Portugal. Therefore, the 
creation of UNAMET initiated by the United Nations to give the right to the 
people in East Timor for referendum whether they choose to be independent 
or still be apart of Indonesia. This paper will try to prove that UNAMET was 
not promoted the right to self-determination for people in East Timor for 
several reasons. Firstly, the peace keeping forces of the UN in East Timor 
were led by Australia, which had a special interest to East Timor regarding 
the East Timor Gap Project. Secondly, UNAMET staff proved to be partial 
in supporting the pro-independence and intimidate the people in society who 
supported the integration with Indonesia by attacking the members of society 
who flew the Indonesian flag. Thirdly, the United Nations proved they were 
only there as a means to protect the US and Australian interests by 
postponing the referendum through the United Nations Security Council, 
which created more instability among the people in East Timor.  
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Introduction 
 Based on the agreement of May 5, 1999 between Indonesia and 
Portugal, both countries agree to offer the East Timorese people a choice by 
referendum between special autonomy and independence49. Hailed by the 
United Nations Secretary General as providing an historic opportunity for a 
                                                          
49 Malone, D, M. (2004). The UN Security Council from the Cold War to the 21st Century. A 
Project of the International Peace Academy. London. Lynne Rienner Publisher 
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just, comprehensive, and internationally acceptable solution to the case of 
East Timor, The New York Accords compromised three separate 
agreements. First, the general agreement between Portugal and Indonesia to 
set forth the lynchpin principle to request the United Nations Secretary 
General to conduct a popular consultation50. As a result, the establishment of 
UNAMET under the United Nations Security Council resolution no. 1246 
was to organize and conduct a popular consultation for the implementation 
of a Referendum in East Timor on the basis of direct, secret, and universal 
ballot in order to ascertain whether East Timorese people would like accept 
the special autonomy or reject integration, thereby leading to East Timor’s 
separation from Indonesia51. The two supplementary agreements were 
tripartite between Portugal, Indonesia and the United Nations and dealt with 
the modalities for the popular consultation or the Modalities Agreement52 
and the security arrangement53.  
 Based on the security agreement, which crucially laid down a second 
lynchpin principle that a secure situation devoid of violence or other forms of 
intimidation is a prerequisite for the holding of a fair and free ballot, as a 
mission of the world body UNAMET was obliged to exercise its mission 
with full responsibility and without the slightest bias for or against either side 
(pro-independence or pro-integration). Nevertheless, in fact UNAMET failed 
to show its integrity as an international arm of the UN and favored one side 
over the other by supporting the pro-independence groups. Likewise, the UN 
peacekeeping forces in East Timor were lead by Australia54. In that 
circumstance, Mr. Santos55 view that Australia has a special interest in East 
                                                          
50 Drew, C. (2001). The East Timor Story: International Law on Trial. European Journal of 
International Law/2001, volume 12/Issue 4. 1 2 (4):651 
51 See United Nations Security Council resolution no. S/RES/1246 (1999). 11 June 1999. 
Retrieved on March 12, 2014, from: http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm or 
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/174/13/PDF/N9917413.pdf?OpenElement  
52 Agreement regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East-Timorese a 
Direct Ballot (Modalities Agreement), A/53/951, Annex II of Report of the Secretary-
General, S/1999/513, supra note 11. Retrieved on March 11, 2014, from; 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/513  
53 East Timor Popular Consultation Agreement Regarding Security (Security Agreement) 
A/53/951, Annex III of the Report of the Secretary-General, S/1999/513, supra note 11. 
Retrieved on March 11, 2014, from; 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/513  
54 The Australian Army. (2012). East Timor peacekeeping mission to conclude. Retrieved on 
May 6, 2014, from: http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/News-and-media/News-and-media-
2012/News-and-media-December-2012/East-Timor-peacekeeping-mission-to-conclude  
55 Chris Santos, a former senior journalist at The Sun, travelled to East Timor just before the 
Portuguese relinquished it as a colony in 1975. He became a member of the Fretilin 
independence movement during that year's civil war, which preceded the Indonesian 
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 Timor due to the huge Timor Gap Project dealing with the oil of East 
Timor that Australia wanted to invest in56 meant that the UNAMET 
members’ staff forced the society to choose independence, where most of 
them were coming from Australia and the United States of America57. 
Furthermore, the western countries interests, especially the interests of 
Australia and the United States, could be seen in the case of East Timor. 
These countries were supporting East Timor to be a part of Indonesia in 
1975, but conversely the US and Australia were also supporting the 
independence of East Timor when the calls for a referendum were starting 
and when the UN began to become involved in it. Both Australia and the 
United States simply changed their attitude into not supporting Indonesia at 
all, as they used to in the era of the Cold War. 
 Therefore, this paper will try to analyze whether or not UNAMET, as 
a UN representative, was neutral in organizing and overseeing the process of 
a ballot by discussing three concerns: Firstly, it will briefly discuss the 
historical background of the conflict between Indonesia and East Timor, and 
ask why the United Nations needed to become involved and create a special 
body to deal with it. Secondly, the effectiveness and role of UNAMET as a 
UN mandate will be discussed. Thirdly, it will analyze the international 
pressure, especially from the United States and Australia, in supporting East 
Timor independence through UNAMET.  
 
Chronological Background 
 Historically, Indonesia was colonialized by the Dutch, while East 
Timor was colonialized by the Portuguese. East Timor was only of marginal 
importance to Portugal’s Empire because The Portuguese had a limited 
amount of control over East Timor, Portugal had little permanent cultural 
impact on East Timor. By 1749 the Dutch, who had replaced the Portuguese 
as the main colonizer in the eastern archipelago, took the western half of the 
island, and the border between East and West Timor was not delineated until 
                                                                                                                                                     
invasion months later. He had become Fretilin's information officer, but was forced to flee to 
Australia just before the invasion. He became a close associate of Mr Ramos Horta during 
this time and returned to East Timor after the country voted for independence in 1999. 
56 Hazibuan, M, R. (1999). UNAMET must not take sides. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved on 
March 11, 2014, from; http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/1999/08/11/unamet-must-not-
take-sides.html  
57 Chusna, M. (2007). KKP Ungkap kecurangan UNAMET di Timtim (Fact and Alliance 
Committee revealed UNAMET’s fraud in East Timor).  Retrieved on March 11, 2014, from: 
http://news.okezone.com/read/2007/07/23/1/34957/kkp-ungkap-kecurangan-unamet-di-
timtim  
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191358. The Dutch held on to West Timor until, with the rest of the Dutch 
East Indies, West Timor become independent of the Netherlands in 
December 1945 and became a part of Indonesia. When the dictatorship was 
overthrown in Portugal in April 1974, so much political activity boiled to the 
surface so quickly that it was obvious that the underground had been active. 
Three major political parties were formed: the Uniao Democratica 
Timorense (UDT) in early May 1974 and, less than two weeks later, the 
Social Democratic Union (known as FRETELIN). Both supported 
independence. The third party was the Indonesian-backed APODETI 
(Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense) which was already committed 
to integration with Indonesia.59 The APODETI party was prepared to 
consider a merger with Indonesia, which expected East Timor to govern 
itself and enjoy the same privileges as other Special Regions such as 
Yogyakarta and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. It would take place in 
accordance with international law through a properly organized referendum, 
following a transitional period of one or two years in which the people of 
East Timor could get to know Indonesia as a whole and learn the Indonesian 
language (Bahasa Indonesia).60 Coming shortly after the formation of 
APODETI and with the growing awareness amongst Dili’s elite of its ties 
with Indonesia, Indonesia felt that East Timor was part of the Indonesian 
archipelago in the first place. 
 Starting from the civil war in East Timor, Fretelin, which is known as 
a Marxist sectarian group, acquired help with weaponry. This help came 
from the Portuguese, Australia, and New Zealand offering armaments, and 
made them a particularly powerful group in East Timor61. On 28 November 
1975, Fretelin unilaterally proclaimed independence and the founding of the 
Democratic Republic of East Timor, with Xavier do Amaral as president, 
Ramos Horta as foreign minister, and Nicola Lobato as prime minister. 
Responding to that proclamation, the majority of the society under Arnaldo 
dos Reis Araujo refused to accept it, and then civil war was unavoidable. 
                                                          
58 BBC News Asia. (2013). East Timor Profile. Last updated 25 July 2013 at 11:14.  
Retrieved on March 14, 2014, from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
14952883  
59 Wurfel, D. (2007). Democracy, Nationalism, and Ethnic Identity: The Philippines and 
East Timor Compared. Democratization and Identity – Regimes and Ethnicity in East and 
Southeast Asia. Plymouth. Lexington Books. p.210  
60 Carey, P & Cox, S. (1995). Generations of Resistance – East Timor. Cambridge. 
Cambridge University Press. p. 15-16 
61 Adiguna, M. (2013). “Masa Integrasi adalah Masa Terindah Bagi Timor Timur” 
(Integration Era was The Best Era in East Timor). Retrieved on March 11, 2014, from; 
http://politik.kompasiana.com/2013/03/07/masa-integrasi-adalah-masa-terindah-bagi-timor-
timur-539975.html  
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Indonesian naval, air, and land forces invaded the territory62. Soon 
afterwards the Indonesian Foreign Minister announced the establishment of a 
“provincial government”. Consequently, in the new order of Indonesia under 
President Soeharto, East Timor was the 27th province of Indonesia, and the 
Indonesian parliament approved a bill for the incorporation of Indonesia’s 
new province on July 17, 197663. However, in December 1976 the General 
Assembly of the United Nations rejected the claim that East Timor had been 
integrated into Indonesia since the people in the territory had not been able to 
freely exercise their right to self-determination.64 The United Nations never 
recognized the integration of East Timor into Indonesia because East Timor 
is administered by Portugal as an overseas province.65 As a result, the UN 
believed that it needed to have an agreement between Indonesia and 
Portugal, as the previous East Timor colonializing nation, to make East 
Timor become integrated into Indonesia. That is why the UN decided to 
create UNAMET. 
 The UN created UNAMET (United Nations Mission on East Timor) 
to facilitate the referendum that was offered by BJ Habibie as the next 
President after Soeharto because of international pressure, especially from 
Australia and the United States. In fact, initially the US gave Soeharto a 
green light to invade East Timor. Ninety percent of the weaponry used by the 
Indonesian forces in their invasion was from the United States (despite a 
U.S. law that bans the use of its military aid for offensive purposes), and the 
flow of arms, including counterinsurgency equipment, was secretly 
increased.66 The United States also lent diplomatic support to the invaders. In 
the United Nations, U.S. ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan successfully 
worked, as he boasted in his memoirs, to make sure that the international 
organization was ineffective in challenging Jakarta’s aggression. Under the 
presidency of Jimmy Carter, there was a further increase in U.S. military aid 
to Indonesia. Since 1975, the United States has sold Jakarta over $1 billion 
                                                          
62 Purnawanty, J (2000). Various Perspectives on Understanding the East Timor Crises, 14 
Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 65.p.79-80 
63 Clark, R, S. (2000). East Timor, Indonesia, and the International Community. 14 Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal 75-87. p.81 
64 General Assembly Resolution. GA Res 31/53 of December 1, 1976. Question on Timor. 
Retrieved on March 11, 2014, from; 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/31/53&Lang=E&Area=RES
OLUTION  
65  United Nations (2000). The United Nations and East Timor - A Chronology 
Retrieved on May 8, 2014, from: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/Untaetchrono.html 
66 Chomsky. N. (1999). East Timor Questions and Answer. Retrieved on March 14, 2014, 
from: http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199910--02.htm  
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worth of military equipment.67 In addition, the integration of East Timor into 
Indonesia was acknowledged by the USA. The reason behind this was 
because the staunchly anti-communist regime of Indonesia was considered 
by the United States to be an essential counterweight, and a friendly 
relationship with the Indonesian government was considered to be more 
important than the decolonization process in East Timor for the containment 
policy toward communism68. Furthermore, in September 1974, Australian 
Prime Minister Gough Whitlam met with Soeharto and indicated that he 
would support Indonesia if it annexed East Timor, and Australia became the 
only government to officially recognise East Timor as a province of 
Indonesia.69 Indonesia conducted some very serious diplomacy with the 
Portuguese. On 12 June1974, Deputy of the Indonesian Parliament John 
Naro, a member from Eastern Indonesia, argued in parliament that Indonesia 
should ‘work out a special policy on Portuguese Timor so that the area could 
once again return to Indonesia’s control’70. It proves that historically, before 
the Portuguese were coming into East Timor to colonialize it, East Timor 
was basically under the control of the Majapahit Empire, which was the 
largest empire in Southeast Asia and covered South Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Brunei Darusslam, Indonesia, and Timor Leste.71 
 The atmosphere of the Fretilin movement to separate from Indonesia 
was not being stopped by the Indonesian declaration in having East Timor as 
part of their integration. When Indonesia was under crisis politically and 
economically in 1998, Soeharto resigned as President, and this made the 
separation movement even bigger due to the violation of human rights 
carried out by the Indonesian Army, and this made Australia report them to 
the United Nations.  
 
The International Pressure on Indonesia  
 Australian governments saw a good relationship and stability in 
Indonesia (Australia's largest neighbor) as providing an important security 
                                                          
67 Ibid 
68 Schwarz, A. (1994). A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s. Westview Press. p.207 
69 Dunn, J. (1996) Timor: A People Betrayed. Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 
Australia, John Wiley & Sons Inc. p.345 
70 Taylor, J, G. (1991).  Indonesia’s Forgotten War-The Hidden History of East Timor. 
Australia. Pluto Press Australia. p. 29 
71 Cribb, R. (2010). Digital Atlas of Indonesian  Hisotory of Majapahit’s Overseas Empire. 
Retrieved on March 6, 2014, from: 
http://www.indonesianhistory.info/map/majapahit.htmlstory.  
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buffer to Australia's north.72 Australia was a secondary actor. Australia is not 
a major actor but is a securitizing actor which positioned itself in a double 
line, thus indicating a very good relationship with East Timor. Australia 
began to involve itself in the conflict in East Timor at the time of the 
referendum in mid-1999 and continues to do so to the present day. Led by 
Australia, who contributed the biggest number of 5,500 personnel and the 
force commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove, it was tasked with 
restoring peace and security, protecting and supporting UNAMET, and 
facilitating humanitarian assistance73. Australia gives effect to East Timor as 
a non-material form of political support in the United Nations, and with the 
involvement of Australian troops in the UN peacekeeping force through 
UNAMET.  
 Australia’s foreign policy influenced East Timor’s fate; from the 
approval of the Indonesian invasion to Australian peacekeeping forces 
ensuring independence. By opting for a foreign policy that promoted a good 
relationship with Indonesia above any other obligations, Australia benefited 
from the oppression and murder of thousands of people. How and why 
Australia betrayed, and then ‘saved,’ East Timor is a heady mix of economic 
and political self-interest with media coverage74.  
 Some opinions said that the real case of East Timor was basically the 
formation of the interests of the West. Mark Aarons and Robert Domm, in 
the book East Timor: A Western Made Tragedy, reveal that the dual attitude 
and hypocrisy which Australia and the United States showed that both 
countries had become accomplices over one big tragedy after World War 
II.75 It could be seen that Australia showed support for the integration of East 
Timor into Indonesia, but the attitude of Australia was puzzling. Supposedly, 
Australia and the United States revealed that Indonesian violence against 
East Timorese was unacceptable,76 but in reality Australia and the U.S. were 
pressing tacitly by ensuring that Portugal handed over the territory 
peacefully. In addition, the U.S. also persuaded Portugal to run a 10-year 
program that is associated with the right to self-determination for East 
Timor. Australia and the U.S. used to support East Timor attempts to 
                                                          
72 National Achieve of Australia. Australia’s Prime Minister. Australian Government. 
Retrieved on March 15, 2014, from: 
http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/keating/in-office.aspx  
73 Australian War Memorial. (2000). Australians and Peacekeeping. Retrieved on March 14, 
2014, from: http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/peacekeeping.asp  
74 Wilson, B (2009). How Australia Betrayed Then “Saved” East Timor. Retrieved on 
March 11, 2014, from: http://www.onyamagazine.com/australianaffairs/history/how-
australia-betrayed-then-saved-east-timor/#sthash.u8wmP5Fp.dpuf 
75 Aarons, M & Domm, R. (1992). East Timor – A Western Made Tragedy. United 
Kingdom. Left Book Club.  
76 Ibid 
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integrate with Indonesia, but this turned into accusations of human rights 
violations by Indonesia against East Timor77. Australia has actually long 
been concerned that East Timor does not fall into the hands of hostile parties, 
and Australia looked for many ways to avoid this, including making East 
Timor a controlled area of Portugal. This suggests that there were definitely 
foreign interests involved in the East Timor case. 
 Large oil and gas reserves lie in the sea between the two countries in 
an area known as the Timor Gap. Territorial disputes over control of this 
resource, which some geologists estimate could pump out over $10 billion of 
oil and gas, have colored diplomacy over East Timor, both when it was an 
Indonesian possession and since. Australia broke with many of its allies and 
recognized Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in 1976 in what was widely 
seen by analysts at the time as a quid pro quo for a treaty favorable to 
Australia involving oil and gas exploration in the area. Since East Timor's 
independence, disputes over how much of a split Dili would receive when 
the resource is finally developed have been an occasional strain on an 
otherwise close relationship.78 Australia then led a United Nations 
backed International Force for East Timor to end the violence, and order was 
restored. While the intervention was ultimately successful, the Australian-
Indonesian relationship would take several years to recover.79 
 According to US Secretary General of State, James B. Foley, the 
United States is proud to have supported UNAMET in its administration of a 
successful election in East Timor.80 In the UN Security Council, the United 
States voiced support for the introduction of an international force into East 
Timor.81 Fifteen Senators, led by Russell Feingold (D-WI), wrote to 
President Clinton in 1996 stating that people in the US believed that the 
moment was right for the United States to take a leading role in advocating 
                                                          
77 Singh, U, B. (2000). Indonesia: From Economic Crises to Political Turmoil. Retrieved on 
March 14, 2014, from: http://www.idsa-india.org/an-nov-00-9.html  
78 Marks, K. (2004). Australia casts a shadow over East Timor's future. The Independent 
News. Retrieved on March 14, 2014, from: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/australia-casts-a-shadow-over-east-
timors-future-6168509.html  
79 Wessel, I & Wimhofer, G. (2001). How many deaths? Problems in the statistics of 
massacre in Indonesia (1965-1966) and East Timor (1975-1980). Retrieved on March 15, 
2014, from: 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=robert_cribb  
80 United States Department of States. Office of the Spokesman For Immediate Release 
August 31, 1999  Statement By James B. Foley, Deputy Spokesman. Indonesia: UNAMET 
Carries Out Successful Vote. Retrieved on March 14, 2014, from: http://1997-
2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/ps-indonesia_990831.html  
81 Schenier, C. (1999). United Nations Takes Over East Timor, Belatedly and Reluctantly. 
Voice of East Timor Action Network/US. ISSN #1088-8136. Vol. 5, No. 3. Autumn 1999 
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for the right of the East Timorese to choose their own government through a 
UN-sponsored referendum.82  
 On July 10 1998, the Senate unanimously adopted S.Res.237, 
introduced by Feingold and Jack Reed (D-RI). This resolution called on 
President Clinton to encourage the new leadership in Indonesia to institute 
genuine democratic reforms. The resolution also urged the President to work 
actively to carry out the UN resolutions on East Timor and to support an 
internationally-supervised referendum on self-determination83. During his 
first presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton said that the U.S. 
approach to East Timor had been "unconscionable." In a 1993 press 
conference, President Clinton turned aside the argument that pressuring 
Indonesia on East Timor and human rights would have an adverse impact on 
business. The relationship of U.S. corporations in Indonesia meant they were 
engaged in many lines of business, and the relationship with Jakarta is one of 
mutual profit, a basic fact unaffected by Timor policy.84  
 
Critiques towards United Nations  
 The United Nations General Assembly placed East Timor on the 
international agenda in 1960, when it added the territory to its list of Non-
Self-Governing Territories. But the UN does not have much to show for 
almost four decades of work. Nearly 40 years later, an agreement between 
the UN, Indonesia and Portugal gave the people of East Timor a historic 
opportunity to decide their own fate.85 The 1975 session of the UN General 
Assembly coincided with the announcement of the de facto Fretilin 
government and the subsequent Indonesian invasion. The General Assembly 
adopted resolution 3485 calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces, and 
they recommended that urgent action needed to be taken by the UN Security 
Council in order to protect East Timor’s territorial integrity and the Timorese 
right of self-determination. All General Assembly resolutions are non-
binding, and so Indonesia was free to ignore it without breaking its 
international obligations86.  
 In contrast, the UN Security Council had far more power. Under the 
UN Charter, all member nations pledge themselves to follow Security 
                                                          
82 East Timor Action Network. (2010). Background on East Timor and US Policy. Retrieved 
on March 14, 2014, from: http://etan.org/timor/BkgMnu.htm  
83 Ibid 
84 Ibid 
85 UN News Centre. (2002). Timor-Leste: UN admits newest member state. Retrieved on 
March 11, 2014, from: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=27&Body=timor&Body1  
86 Suter, K. (1997). East Timor, West Papua/Irian and Indonesia. Minority Right Group 
International. London. MRG. p. 13 
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Council resolutions. Portugal complained to the Security Council about the 
invasion of “its territory”. As a result, on 22 December 1975 the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 384, calling for the withdrawal of Indonesia’s 
forces. East Timor has also appeared on the agendas of other UN bodies, 
such as the Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission. Annual 
sessions have been marked by Indonesia lobbying to get East Timor dropped 
from the commission’s business. This had not been successful. For example, 
at the 1993 session of the Commission on Human Rights, and again in 1997, 
a majority of member states supported a strongly-worded resolution 
condemning Indonesia for gross and systematic human right violations in 
East Timor.87 The United Nations claimed that the serious problems faced by 
East Timor were serious crimes and defined as genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, murder, sexual offenses and torture.88 Those phenomenon 
were claimed by the United Nations, which made the United Nations 
Security Council consolidate, facilitate, and save Timorese people by making 
up the special mission called the United Nations Mission on East Timor 
(UNAMET). 
 In implementing its vision and mission in East Timor, UNAMET 
found some frauds that stood by UNAMET before the referendum, such as 
the recruitment of local staff who were only taken from the pro-
independence group. Moreover, most of the polling stations, from 274 
polling stations with more than 700 voting booths, were located near 
settlements in the pro–independence area. UNAMET also seems to be very 
reckless as to who it lends its vehicles to, who it employs, (approximately 91 
percent of about 4,000 local staff are pro-independence supporters), and 
whose house they decide to illegally search.89 Other reports have been 
circulated by non-partial NGO charity organizations and independent 
observers, The Forum for Peace, Democracy and Justice (FPDK) has 
discovered more than 100 rule violations committed by UNAMET personnel 
during the August 30 popular consultation. Most of the violations were acts 
by UNAMET staffers to force voters to choose independence.90 The 
UNAMET staff intimidated and threatened people with the Indonesian flag 
in front of their house, and forced them to lower it under threat of violence 
                                                          
87 Ibid, p.14 
88 Shaw. M, N. (2008). International Law. 6th edition. Cambridge. Cambridge University 
Press. p. 425  
89 Sangster, G, K. (1999).  UNAMET Rails. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved on March 11, 2014, 
from: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/1999/08/19/unamet-rails.html 
90 Damiri. A (2007). Ballot-Violations: Forum Discovered More Than 100 Cases of 
UNAMET. Antara News. Retrieved on March 11, 2014, from: 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/57510/adam-damiri--unamet-bertanggungjawab-atas-
lepasnya-timtim 
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from dozens of people if their orders were not adhered to immediately.91 On 
July 16, 1999 in the village districts of Ritabo Maliana Bobonaro, 3 members 
of the public force of UNAMET removed clothes labeled pro-autonomy and 
which were supporting integration, and they lowered the flag of Indonesia 
that was still flying in people's homes. 
 Within hours of the results, paramilitary groups had begun attacking 
people and setting fires around the capital city of East Timor-Dili. Foreign 
journalists and election observers fled, and tens of thousands of East 
Timorese took to the mountains. Islamic gangs attacked Dili's 
Catholic Diocese building, killing two dozen people, and the next day the 
headquarters of the ICRC was attacked and burned to the ground. Almost 
one hundred people were killed later in Suai, and reports of similar 
massacres poured in from around East Timor92. Those violations happened 
because UNAMET was proven to be impartial and not neutral, and then it 
started the pro-integration to mutiny by attacking the pro-independence 
group.93 Therefore, the riots and chaos were unavoidable because of the 
anger of the pro-integration group, who felt unfairly treated by the UN. 
Therefore, UNAMET was the organisation responsible with that.94 It should 
be taken into consideration by all foreign personnel in East Timor that they 
are guests there, and as guests they should behave accordingly. 
 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also behaved in the same way by 
arbitrarily postponing the referendum date. All of the unfavorable things 
happening in East Timor, as far as the referendum was concerned, might 
result from a policy which was too lenient on the part of the Indonesian 
government in dealing with violations of referendum procedures.95 He knew 
that the arrangement was a recipe for disaster, but no government - certainly 
not the United States - would pressure Indonesia to improve the conditions 
for the referendum. As militia violence continued and their links to Indonesia 
became more obvious to the international community, Annan was unable to 
make significant changes in the process. He delayed the vote twice, and 
increased the number of Military Liaison Officers (MLOs), unarmed 
international soldiers who consult with the Indonesian army in a similar way 
                                                          
91 Ibid 
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New York: Cornell University Press. p. 100-104 
93 Op-cit  
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to the unarmed Civilian Police Advisers (Civpols) who advised the police.96 
Those conditions made it easier for the pro-independence group to spread 
their wave of terror among pro-integration groups for much longer.  
 
Conclusion 
 The creation of UNAMET initiated by the United Nations was not 
promoted the right to self-determination for people in East Timor for several 
reasons. Firstly, the peace keeping forces of the UN in East Timor were led 
by Australia, which had a special interest to East Timor regarding the East 
Timor Gap Project where Australia’s interest into the East Timor’s oil 
projects. Moreover, geographically East Timor is so close with Australia, so 
it would be so efficient for Australia having oil from its neighborhood with 
extremely cheap prices. Secondly, UNAMET staff proved to be partial in 
supporting the pro-independence and intimidate the people in society who 
supported the integration with Indonesia by attacking the members of society 
who flew the Indonesian flag. Thirdly, the United Nations proved they were 
only there as a means to protect the US and Australian interests by 
postponing the referendum through the United Nations Security Council, 
which created more instability among the people in East Timor.  
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